

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
Office of The Director
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland

DCI/we

14 December 1962

SECRET

Executive Registry

62-9556

MEMORANDUM FOR LT. GENERAL MARSHALL CARTER,
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

1. As you requested, I have made a personal study of the attached file. It has not been discussed with the NSA Staff. I have assumed that you would like my reaction to it as well as any comments I might have on how to handle it.

2. At the outset, I must admit that I have had trouble with this paper as a member of USIB -- not because of a strong NSA interest in this matter but primarily because of paragraph 3 of the Foreword. The assumptions made in this paragraph act, in my opinion, to reduce the paper to a somewhat theoretical treatise on raw Soviet capabilities. Unfortunately, most people reading it will react with at least some assumption in their minds as to "action of opposing Western forces" or "effect on Soviet theater forces of an initial strategic nuclear exchange." In fact, even the estimate prepared by Mr. Kent comes a cropper at times from Par. 3 -- for example, the last sentence of conclusion K does appear to bring in the effect of nuclear exchange. However, the Kent version is relatively clean on this standpoint and does, I think, do a reasonable job as to raw capabilities. The Air Force version does not do particular violence to Par. 3 either, although I get a strong hunch that [] is perhaps unconsciously considering both the actions of Western forces and the effect of the nuclear exchange.

3. I'm too new at this USIB business to know just how far a footnote can go. DCID No. 1/1 in par. 5 ensures that a footnote is a right of the members but does imply that it applies to a pertinent portion in footnote style with a statement of the dissenter's position. The trouble here is that the Air Force version is a new set of conclusions generally along the same lines in many cases as the original version but not possible to relate in what I would call "footnote" style. Frankly, the differences are so built into the nuances of expression as well as new material by the Air Force that I could find no easy way to resolve this via the footnote procedure.

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4. I think we should make a determined effort to reduce the apparent degree of difference between these two versions. As Mr. Kent points out, the Air Force version does include many paragraphs in which there is little difference between the versions although, because of the relettering, there appears to be a great deal of difference. For example, if you compare ONE's par. I with Air Force par. L there is a lot of resemblance but the real differences are substantive and debatable (ONE says Far East is peripheral and lesser priority whereas Air Force says Far East is more important and does not put in lesser priority class -- as an old Pacific hand, I must admit I vote with AF on this one point). ONE's par. G and AF's par. K are analagous. Frankly, I did not find that the way this file is organized presented the real differences clearly and did tend to give an erroneous first impression that there was very little in common between the two versions.

5. The relettering used by the Air Force is responsible for some of the confusion. However, there are aspects of the Air Force version which I think deserve serious study which, of course, I have not given the matter. ONE's par. A and Pars. A and B of the AF version cover the same doctrinal area but give it quite different emphasis as to the why of Soviet doctrine -- personally I'd like to hear the students of both positions debate the reasons for different derivations from the same material. Another reason for the relettering is that AF has new material in their conclusions. For example, par. D is noted as "not comparable," I suppose for the reason it is a new conclusion -- if so, it looks like an important matter to me which should be debated as why it is derived by the Air Force -- or conversely, why it is not deemed pertinent by ONE. Another relettering reason is that represented by the fact that ONE's L and M are comparable to C, although the words are not similar as in the cases noted above. [] apparently thinks the conclusions flow together better that way. I find little to choose between these choices as to location in the list of conclusions.

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6. I tried to back off and read both versions completely through without going back and forth between them, and then ask myself which one came through best as the version I'd rather start with for correction. I thought that the Air Force version read better and came through louder and clearer with a message than the ONE version. I realize that we have always started off with the ONE version in USIB and have rather sensed that maybe this was a sacred SOP -- although, the vagaries of the English language being what they are, I don't think this much pride of authorship is a privilege any of us in USIB should treasure.

7. Where do I recommend we go from here?

a. Try to get Air Force pars. A and B into one footnote as applying to ONE's par. A.

b. Ask ONE to agree to the pars. L and M ideas being brought forward to a position right after par. A (a new B in other words). I doubt that you can get complete agreement on this paragraph, but perhaps can get one which can then be footnoted by the Air Force.

c. Ask AF to put all new items, such as pars. D, F, and I, into one footnote as additional conclusions at the end.


d. This will leave a number of competing paragraphs which have much similarity and which can be isolated either for agreement or a shorter, less confusing footnote.

e. During USIB consideration of these differences, arrange for discussion particularly on 7a and c, above.

8. Hopefully, the above procedure would give major footnotes on par. A and B (new lettering), new conclusions at the end, and workable footnotes in the other paragraphs.


AF

↑
(as AF footnotes)


GORDON A. BLAKE
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. McCone

General Carter has read the Air Force dissent to the theatre forces estimate and has directed ONE to hold up dissemination of the estimate pending your reaction to the Air Force dissent.



8 December
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(4)

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